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 We aim here for a better understanding of the Japanese keiretsu. Our
 essential claim is that to understand the Japanese system-banks with extensive
 investment in industry and industry with extensive cross-ownership-we must
 understand the problems of industrial organization, not just the problems of
 corporate governance. The Japanese system, we assert, functions not only to
 harmonize the relationships among the corporation, its shareholders, and its
 senior managers, but also to facilitate productive efficiency.
 Comparative corporate governance, once an academic backwater, now enjoys
 important government and scholarly attention. U.S. government reports attribute
 Japan's competitive success in part to features of the Japanese system.1 Harvard
 Business School's major, multi-disciplinary study of American management's
 1. See, e.g, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM. ON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUPERVISION, REGULATION AND
 INSURANCE, TASK FORCE ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS OF U.S. FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS OF
 THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING. FINANCE AND URBAN AFFAIRS, H.R. REP. No. 7, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
 7-8, 66, 189-90, 193-94 (1990) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT] (Japanese "cross-shareholding arrangements
 create real linkages with real advantages"; "the 'keiretsu' system [is] a very effective system designed to
 maintain Japanese business competitiveness").
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 time horizons recommends, as a way to combat "short-termism" among U.S.
 managers, restructuring American corporate governance so that it resembles
 Japan's more closely.2
 This newfound interest derives from two changes, one domestic and one
 international. The domestic change is evident in scholars' new understanding
 of America's corporate governance system; during a short period of time, the
 basic paradigm has shifted. The "traditional" model of American corporate
 governance presented the Berle-Means corporation-characterized by a separation
 of ownership and management resulting from the need of growing enterprises
 for capital and the specialization of management-as the pinnacle in the
 evolution of organizational forms. Given this model's dominance, the study of
 comparative corporate governance was peripheral; governance systems differing
 from the American paradigm were dismissed as mere intermediate steps on the
 path to perfection, or as evolutionary dead-ends, the neanderthals of corporate
 governance. Neither laggards nor dead-ends made compelling objects of study.
 More recent scholarship challenges the "traditional" view, arguing that the
 separation of ownership and management-and the absence of substantial
 shareholders or lenders to monitor professional management-is historically
 and politically contingent. In particular, in the United States, populism,
 federalism, and interest group conflicts combined to restrict the growth of large
 financial intermediaries, especially banks, and constrained other efforts to oversee
 management, through a regulatory web of banking, insurance, tax, and securities
 laws.3 The American system may be the product of an evolutionary process,
 but its development has been affected by features of our politics, some of which
 are fundamental to democracy, some peculiar to American democracy. Nothing
 in that process assures the American system's productive superiority to systems
 that evolved under different conditions.
 The second change-heightened international competition-has made it
 important to understand the contingency of American corporate governance.
 The globalization of commerce and the postwar reemergence of the Japanese
 and European economies has required American corporations to compete with
 organizations having dramatically different governance systems. In this new
 environment, competition exists not only among products, but also among
 governance systems, and American firms are not always winning. Thus, real
 world competition has obliged business scholarship to focus on comparative
 corporate governance. Because the American system is now seen as contingent,
 2. Michael Porter, Remarks at the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Forum on Corporate
 Governance and American Economic Competitiveness: The Role of Shareholders, Directors and Management
 41-62 (Mar. 20, 1992) (transcript on file with authors).
 3. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 10 (199 1)
 [hereinafter Roe, A Political Theory]; Mark J. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control
 of Public Companies, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 7 (1990); Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital,
 27 J. FIN. ECON. 89 (1990). See generally Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV.
 Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61.
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 and other systems seemed in the 1980's to be doing better, understanding the
 differences has become urgent.4
 Yet, we shall argue here, our system's characteristics color the lens through
 which the first comparative studies viewed the rest of the world. Analysis of
 American corporate governance has always sought to solve the problem of
 separation of ownership and control: who will monitor management in light of
 dispersed shareholdings. Favored candidates for this monitoring role have shifted
 from outside directors5 to the market for corporate control, and, most recently,
 to institutional investors. As a result, the primary focus in comparative studies
 of Japanese corporate governance has been the role of the main bank. Conven-
 tional wisdom among American scholars has been that the Japanese system
 solves the corporate governance problem-who monitors management-through
 continuous monitoring by a financial intermediary, rather than through inter-
 mittent and often disruptive monitoring by capital markets.6 Relying on this
 analysis, reform proposals have identified institutional investors as having the
 potential to provide Japanese-style monitoring in the American system.7
 To date, comparative analyses of the Japanese corporate governance system
 have assumed that the central purpose of the Japanese system, like that of the
 American system, is solving the Berle-Means monitoring problem. We argue
 that the Japanese system serves a function in addition to the monitoring of
 management. Our Japanese model reflects not only the need for corporate
 governance, the traditional factor American scholars have identified as shaping
 corporate structures, but also the need to support production and exchange-what
 we will call contractual governance.8 To be sure, complex multi-level
 monitoring is part of the production process, but this monitoring is motivated
 not just by financial institutions seeking a return on capital, but also by product
 market competition. Bank monitoring thus should not be seen in isolation, but
 4. Business Roundtable, Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness, 46 Bus. LAW. 241,
 242-43 (1990); see sources cited supra notes 2-3.
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 17-24.
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 31-36.
 7. See, e.g, Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,
 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992) [hereinafter Black, Agents Watching Agents]; Bernard S. Black, The Value
 of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REV. 895 (1992) [hereinafter
 Black, Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring]; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the
 Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991); Jensen, supra note
 3.
 8. While Carl Kester does not draw this distinction, his work, together with that of Professor Masahiko
 Aoki, is unusual in its focus on the relationship between the production process and corporate governance.
 See W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 53 (1991)
 [hereinafter KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS] ("The overall effect of Japanese corporate governance is to
 foster tremendous efficiencies in the execution of business transactions by making it easier to build and
 maintain long-term relationships."); Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm,
 28 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1 (1990) [hereinafter Aoki, Toward an Economic Model]; MASAHIKO AOKI, THE
 JAPANESE FIRM AS A SYSTEM OF ATTRIBUTES: A SURVEY AND RESEARCH AGENDA (Center for Economic
 Policy Research Working Paper No. 288, 1992) [hereinafter AoKI, A SYSTEM OF ATTRIBUTES]; W. CARL
 KESTER, GOVERNANCE, CONTRACTING, AND INVESTMENT TIME HORIZONS (Harvard Business School Working
 Paper No. 92-003, 1991) [hereinafter KESTER, GOVERNANCE].
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 as one specific (although important) kind of a wide range of contractual
 monitoring types in Japan. An empirical observation informs this perspective:
 although financial institutions hold one-half of Japanese public firm stock, often
 in highly-concentrated blocks, another quarter of Japanese stock is held by other
 corporations, often suppliers or customers.9
 Our claims are modest. We do not contend that our model fully describes
 the Japanese system; we do not seek to displace the main-bank-as-monitor
 paradigm. Indeed, we doubt that any single model fully captures the system's
 complexity. Rather, we mean to show only that (1) our model captures an
 important element missed thus far, and that (2) intermediary monitoring is only
 one part of a larger Japanese system of contractual governance. We also do not
 seek to discredit proposals that would reform American corporate governance
 by enabling intermediaries to monitor management more effectively. The path-
 dependent development of the American Berle-Means corporation might well
 indicate that intermediary monitoring is now the best solution for the American
 corporation's deeper governance problems. But the broader contractual
 governance structure characteristic of large Japanese firms, having taken another
 evolutionary path, cannot be duplicated exactly in the United States by changing
 only the role of financial intermediaries.10
 Apart from the corporate governance debate, international trade issues
 surround the keiretsu. Some Americans see keiretsu cross-ownership as an
 anticompetitive, exclusionary structure, sufficient to make it a subject of bilateral
 trade talks.1" Specifically, the U.S. Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) views
 cross-ownership as a productive, yet exclusionary, device.
 These two functions of cross-ownership-monitoring and producing-are
 left unconnected in the literature. While we offer no comment on the specific
 elements of the SII (in fact, the keiretsu structure's efficiency may be a source
 of the exclusionary effects), academic theory would profit by seeing, as SII does,
 keiretsu cross-ownership not only as a managerial monitoring mechanism but
 as a productive structure as well. The bank-as-monitor theorists need to account
 for cross-ownership among nonfinancial producers. The impediments theorists
 must consider the potential organizational advantages arising from partial
 cross-ownership among factors of production.12
 9. Stephen D. Prowse, The Structure of Corporate Ownership in Japan, 48 J. FIN. 1121, 1123 (1992);
 Yasaku Futatsugi, What Share Cross-Holdings Mean for Corporate Management, ECON. EYE, Spring 1990,
 at 17, 18.
 10. See Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Governance in Germany, Japan, and America,
 102 YALE L.J. (forthcoming June 1993).
 11. U.S. to Focus on "Keiretsu," Foreign Investment in 51, KYODo NEWS SERV., July 27, 1992
 (reporting U.S. Treasury Dept. pressure on Japan to force keiretsu to become more "transparent" during
 bilateral Structural Impediments Initiative talks), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Kyodo News Service
 File; see also PAUL SHEARD, KEIRETSU AND CLOSEDNESS OF THE JAPANESE MARKET: AN ECONOMIC
 APPRAISAL (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University Discussion Paper No. 273, 1992)
 (economic analysis of claim that keiretsu is exclusionary).
 12. We are quite conscious that our theory here parallels antitrust developments in the 1960's and 1970's.
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 In Part I, we sketch the development of the traditional Berle-Means
 conception of American corporate governance and the succession of potential
 monitors that have led to a comparative focus on Japan. In Part II, we briefly
 summarize the dominant theme of current comparative analysis of Japanese
 corporate governance: the monitoring role of the main bank. In Part III, we set
 out our contractual governance model of the Japanese corporate system, and,
 in Part IV, we explore the model's implications both for comparative corporate
 governance analysis of the Japanese system and for reforming America's
 corporate governance system.
 I. THE BERLE-MEANS MODEL OF AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
 In 1932, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means announced the separation of
 ownership and control in American industry. The Modern Corporation and
 Private Property,13 a book that for some sixty years has defined the intellectual
 mission of American corporate governance, reported that owners of major
 corporations had become atomistic shareholders lacking the ability, skill,
 information, and often the incentives to monitor the performance of specialized
 managers."4 Thereafter, the corporate governance debate became a search for
 the organizational Holy Grail: a mechanism to bridge the separation of ownership
 and control by holding managers accountable for their performance.
 The modern corporate governance literature has treated this separation as
 the efficient response to economic forces. Specialization of risk bearing increased
 the availability of capital by opening investment to individuals who would not
 be active in the firm's operations, and reduced the cost of capital by allowing
 diversification." Efficiency became the standard in the corporate governance
 debate. To increase the value of the corporation, control is delegated to managers
 with specialized skills. But this delegation also gives managers the discretion
 to advance their own agenda at the shareholders' expense. The purpose of
 corporate governance, thus, became minimizing the sum of the costs involved
 in aligning managers and shareholders' incentives and in unavoidable self-
 interested managerial behavior."6
 During that period, the U.S. government attacked partial vertical integration-not unlike that of the
 keiretsu-on the assumption that, absent clearly efficient motives and effects, the structures must have been
 exclusionary. Theorists, and finally courts, later came to view many of these structures as more efficient
 than exclusionary. See Roe, supra note 10.
 13. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
 (1933).
 14. Id. at 47-68.
 15. Alfred Chandler argues that the increasing complexity of business was a more important cause of
 separation than the dispersion of stock holdings. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE
 DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM 232 (1990). Existing owners lacked the skills and information
 necessary either to run modern corporations themselves or to monitor the decisions of those who did. Id.
 16. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
 Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
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 The most enduring institution for minimizing agency cost has been the
 independent director. The concept-that shareholders would bridge their
 separation from managers by electing nonemployee directors to monitor
 management performance-has reached the status of conventional wisdom. The
 Business Roundtable,17 the Conference Board,18 the American Bar Associa-
 tion,'9 the American Law Institute,20 and the Delaware courts21 have all come
 to accord independent directors the primary monitoring role. Substantial doubt
 remains, however, as to independent directors' effectiveness. They typically are
 chosen by management and perceive themselves as "serving at the pleasure of
 the CEO-Chairman."22 In addition, most are chief executive officers of other
 large companies23 who are unlikely to monitor more energetically than they
 would want to be monitored by their own boards.24
 Hostile takeovers during the late 1970's and 1980's provided another
 technique for minimizing agency costs. Here the external monitor-the
 market-replaced the internal monitor. When the market price of a company's
 stock signalled poor managerial performance, those who thought they could do
 better paid the shareholders a premium-reflecting some sharing of the potential
 gain-for the privilege of improving the target company's performance. But
 owing in no small part to the discretion that the Delaware courts and other states'
 legislatures gave target management, takeovers grew more expensive, and some
 states made many takeovers too costly to attempt.25 Moreover, takeovers were
 reactive at best: they attacked much bad management but did not directly prevent
 it. Finally, at least the 1980's generation of takeovers depended on debt
 financing, which dried up at the beginning of the 1990's. Many such takeovers
 17. See Business Roundtable, supra note 4, at 247-48; Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition
 of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2108 (1978) ("We
 note the strong tendency of U.S. business corporations to move toward a board structure based on a majority
 of outside directors-and we endorse it.").
 18. See JEREMY BACON & JAMES K. BROWN, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, CORPORATE DIRECTORSHIP
 PRACTICES: ROLE, SELECTION AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE BOARD (1975).
 19. See Committee on Corporate Laws, Section of Corporation, Banking & Business Law, American
 Bar Association, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1619-21 (1978).
 20. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
 RECOMMENDATIONS ? 3A.01 (Proposed Final Draft 1992).
 21. The Delaware courts have assigned special weight to outside directors' decisions. See Weinberger
 v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (finding merger failed fairness test where feasibility study not shown
 to outside directors); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981) (dismissing derivative suits
 where self-interested board members delegated litigation decision to independent committee of disinterested
 board members); William T. Allen, Independent Directors In MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?,
 45 Bus. LAW. 2055 (1990) (arguing that special committees of outside directors may, if used properly, protect
 shareholder interests) (Allen is Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery).
 22. JAY W. LoRScH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 17
 (1989).
 23. Id. at 18 (63% of outside directors are CEO's of other companies).
 24. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 872-76 (analyzing failings of outside director
 concept).
 25. See Mark J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE (Margaret Blair ed., forthcoming 1993).
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 have resulted in costly recapitalizations, often in Chapter 11. By 1992, the market
 for corporate control was quiet.
 The takeover market's decline coincided with a realization among commenta-
 tors that perhaps the premise underlying the Berle and Means analysis no longer
 held. While no one was looking, shareholders had reaggregated somewhat;
 institutional investors held half the stock of the largest American corporations,
 although in small blocks.26 The blocks were never as concentrated as those
 now found in Japan, but the number of players was often sufficiently small so
 that concerted investor action could be considered-or at least prescribed by
 academics. While a takeover's governance benefits rested on an outsider buying
 enough stock to become a large stockholder, the new aggregation raised the
 possibility that existing large stockholders could provide those benefits without
 takeovers. Some institutions-usually public pension funds-began to act
 somewhat like monitors, making proposals concerning takeover defenses,
 shareholder advisory committees, and director independence.27 Emboldened
 by this activity, reformers even suggested that institutional investors had the
 power to make the outside director concept viable,28 or to set forth the changes
 necessary to make it viable.29
 Once it became clear (1) that the Berle-Means corporation was historically
 and politically contingent and (2) that intermediaries could play a role, other
 patterns of corporate governance became plausible alternatives, including foreign
 patterns in which intermediaries have long played a more important role than
 they have played in the United States.30 Foreign structures no longer seem to
 be laggards struggling to catch up to America's advanced capital markets;
 instead, they have become alternatives to our own structures. Even if we would
 never use the foreign structures as a blueprint for American reform, they might
 help us chart a new course for the large American public corporation.
 26. Carolyn Kay Brancato, The Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets, in
 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING: THE CHALLENGES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 3, 21, Table
 1-7 (Arnold W. Sametz ed., 1991); Carolyn Kay Brancato, Institutional Investors and Capital Markets: 1991
 Update 18 (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
 27. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 7, at 867-76 (reviewing strategies).
 28. See id.; see also Ronald J. Gilson, Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, How the Proxy Rules Discourage
 Constructive Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a Minority of Directors, 17 J. CORP. L. 29, 30-34
 (1992).
 29. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990)
 (reviewing regulatory barriers to institutional shareholders actively participating in corporate governance);
 John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM.
 L. REV. 1277 (1991) (asserting those seeking influence should forego liquidity). As Louis Lowenstein points
 out, index funds, with tiny management fees of two basis points, lack the resources to monitor. Louis
 LOWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN CORPORATE FINANCE 220 (1991). They are the ultimate Berle-Means
 free riders, capable of acting but depending on others to monitor for them.
 30. This argument parallels a similar one made by Michael Piore and Charles Sabel that the American
 system of industrial organization is historically and politically contingent. MICHAEL J. PIORE & CHARLES
 F. SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRIAL DIVIDE: POSSIBILITIES FOR PROSPERITY 19-48 (1984). The parallel is
 especially interesting in light of our suggestion that the Japanese system can be understood as one of industrial
 organization as much as corporate governance. See infra Part IIL.
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 II. THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK AS THE MISSING MONITOR
 Japan, it appeared, had developed a solution to the Berle-Means monitoring
 problem: the main bank. A Japanese corporation had a single bank that provided
 the largest share of its borrowings and also held a substantial equity position.31
 Moreover, the main bank spoke with more than its own authority. Each main
 bank seemed to act as the delegated monitor for other banks lending to its client
 corporation, so that, in effect, the creditors spoke with a single voice.32 The
 main bank required review of a client corporation's business plans33 and, in
 the event of poor performance, intervened to impose new management or
 strategies. It often bailed out a troubled company.34 Thus, the main bank was
 said to provide "an important substitute mechanism for what in effect is a
 'missing' takeover market in Japan; or to put it somewhat differently the main
 bank system serves to internalize the market for corporate control."35
 It is hardly surprising that American commentators were drawn to this picture
 of a monitoring paragon;36 the Japanese main bank confirmed the historical
 and political contingency of American arrangements. American political history
 prevented American financial intermediaries from directly monitoring manage-
 ment.37 America never had widespread main banks, but where financial
 intermediaries were not so severely limited, as in Japan, they helped bridge the
 separation of ownership and management.
 31. See, e.g., Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and Control in Japan,
 11 J. Ec()N. BEHAV. & ORG. 399 (1989). Sheard reports that for corporations listed on the Tokyo Stock
 Exchange, the main bank was the largest or second largest shareholder in 39% of the cases in his sample
 and among the top five shareholders in 72% of the cases. Id. at 402. Similarly, a recent study reports that
 a Japanese corporation's largest lender owned on average 6.2% of equity, its five largest lenders owned
 on average 18.2% of equity, and in 57 of the 133 sample corporations, the largest lender was the largest
 shareholder. Stephen D. Prowse, Institutional Investment Patterns and Corporate Financial Behavior in the
 United States and Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 43, 46-47 (1990).
 32. See Sheard, supra note 31, at 401-03; PAUL SHEARD, DELEGATED MONITORING AMONG DELEGATED
 MONITORS: PRINCIPAL-AGENT ASPECTS OF THE JAPANESE MAIN BANK SYSTEM (Australian National
 University and Osaka University Working Paper, 1992). Such a cooperative allocation of monitoring
 responsibility minimizes duplication and, because other banks act as first-line monitors with respect to other
 companies, reduces incentives to free ride.
 33. "In a 'good' main bank relationship, the firm will consult the bank closely when drawing up its
 business plans and will provide regular reports on its performance." Sheard, supra note 31, at 403.
 34. See, e.g., Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, The Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs
 of Financial Distress in Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 67 (1990). For descriptions of active main bank intervention
 in crises, see KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS, supra note 8, at 70-73; Paul Sheard, The Economics of
 Interlocking Shareholding in Japan, 45 RICERCHE ECONOMICHE 421, 436-38 (1991).
 35. Sheard, supra note 31, at 407.
 36. For example, Michael Jensen stressed that "LBO partnerships play a dual funding and oversight
 role that is similar in many ways to that of the main banks in the Japanese keiretsu." Michael C. Jensen,
 Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1991, at 13, 22. Gilson
 and Kraakman stated the corporate governance challenge as designing "a new structure that duplicates the
 monitoring capabilities of the LBO and [Japanese] banker models." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 7, at
 879. We return to Jensen's comparative analysis of the LBO association later. See infra text accompanying
 notes 109-118.
 37. See Roe, A Political Theory, supra note 3.
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 The standard Japanese bank monitoring story needs qualifications in two
 respects. To the extent that a monopoly control of credit in the Japanese banks
 was critical to their power, the rise of alternative credit sources and the growth
 of corporate retained earnings diminished it.38 While banks-which remain
 as stockholders-might still intervene in the event of a crisis,39 and large blocks,
 even if normally passive, might motivate managers to avoid a crisis, crisis
 intervention is a more limited role than that of an ongoing monitor of business
 strategy. The primary active role of the banks' large stockholdings would not
 be to improve normal corporate governance before crisis-the primary American
 goal-but to facilitate financial and managerial restructuring when big problems
 arose-an important but secondary American goal.
 Second, characterizations of the main bank as "internaliz[ing] the market
 for corporate control"40 need clarification. Displacing inefficient manage-
 ment-management that is performing so poorly as to threaten the corporation's
 economic viability-is one function of takeovers. But it is neither the only
 function41 nor, over lengthy periods, necessarily the most important one. During
 the 1980's, the dominant acquisition motive appears not to have been to remove
 management whose operational performance threatened to bankrupt the company,
 3X. Kester tells us:
 Financial managers at manufacturing companies generally concur with this description of the
 [lessening] degree of monitoring and control exerted over their companies by their traditional
 main banks. Whereas all but one of the companies in the field sample indicated that their corporate
 plans and investments were closely examined by banks during the 1950-1980 period, none reported
 being subject to such scrutiny today. Although meetings with lenders are still held semi-annually
 or at least annually to discuss performance, these have apparently evolved into largely perfunctory
 presentations of past performance rather than substantive discussions of future capital investment.
 KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS, supra note 8, at 197. Other commentators offer similar observations. See,
 e.g., JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 189 (1985) ("The
 conclusion is that dependence on a bank is no more to the liking of Japanese management than management
 in other countries, and for leading Japanese companies no longer a significant issue."); J. Mark Ramseyer,
 Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan, 20 J. LEG. STUD. 91, 98 (1991).
 Available data show a decreased role for banks. In the early 1970's, listed Japanese companies generated
 internally only 36% of their net increase in funds; by the early 1980's, internally generated funds accounted
 for 71 % of the increase. The data with respect to bank borrowings are consistent. In the early 1970's, 41 %
 of the net increase in funds came from bank borrowings. By the mid-1980's, the bank share had dropped
 to 6%. Paul Sheard, Japanese Corporate Finance and Behaviour: Recent Developments and the Impact of
 Deregulation, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF THE YEN 55, 56 (Colin McKenzie &
 Michael Stutchbery eds., 1992). A slowing Japanese economy may well lead industrial firms short of cash
 to restore main bank relationships.
 39. Professor Aoki states: "In the normal course of events ... the main bank exercises explicit control
 neither in the selection of management nor in corporate policy making." Aoki, Toward an Economic Model,
 supra note 8, at 14 (emphasis added). "Financial control by bank cum stockholders concerning corporate
 direction is exercised only in a business crisis." Id. at 16.
 40. Sheard, supra note 31, at 407.
 41. For efforts to identify what proportion of hostile takeovers are made to displace inefficient
 management as opposed to synergy or other strategies, see, e.g., Kenneth Martin & John McConnell,
 Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover, 46 J. FIN. 671 (1991); Randall
 Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Alterative Mechanisms for Corporate Control, 79 AM. ECON.
 REv. 842 (1989); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Characteristics of Targets of Hostile
 and Friendly Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 101 (Alan J. Auerbach
 ed., 1988); see also RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
 ACQUISITIONS: 1991 SuPP. 37-86 (1991) (summarizing literature).
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 but instead to dismantle ineffective conglomerates that were in danger only of
 continuing to throw away their free cash flow.42 Managers were inefficient
 in using an unwieldy structure, but once the (bad) decision had been made to
 keep the structure and invest free cash flow in it, they did as good a job as could
 be done. The prototypical target was RJR Nabisco, not Chrysler. If the Japanese
 main bank has served thus far primarily as a crisis manager, allocator of capital,
 and gatekeeper to bankruptcy, it has not yet shown itself to be a complete
 substitute for America's 1980's takeovers. A complete monitor must (at least)
 reduce poor use of free cash flow, a problem Japan is only beginning to face.
 True, the existence of large blocks of stock whose holders are inactive (short
 of crisis) could improve senior managers' incentives and motivation. The banks,
 with large blocks of stock and (sometimes still) large debt, could define a crisis
 as requiring intervention before there is as much organizational decline as would
 induce a Chapter 11 proceeding. Even the new reduced role of the main bank
 might provide a useful model.
 Moreover, our point is not to criticize the limits of the Japanese main bank
 system. Indeed, the very limits are said by Professors Aoki and Sheard to be
 central to the system's genius. The limits allow managers freedom from outside
 pressure except in crisis so that they can respect commitments to employees.
 In times of crisis, the main bank provides a safety net-the funds and expertise
 to bail the employees out-although at some personal cost to the employees
 and with some positive probability of liquidation. Avoiding bank intervention
 gives both management and employees an incentive for team performance.43
 Our point is instead that the Japanese corporate governance system is not
 only about Berle-Means corporate governance. It also may be an effort to link
 the structural features of the corporation directly to the efficiency of the
 corporation's actual production; it is about industrial organization, not just
 corporate governance. Viewing the Japanese system through Berle-Means
 blinders, in the belief that it reflects only an effort to bridge the separation of
 ownership and control, will cause us to misunderstand it and, as a result, to miss
 the lessons that comparative analysis can offer.
 Recent work by economists is consistent with a model of Japanese
 contractual governance. Much of it has focused on the Japanese firms' ability
 to provide incentives making the interests of owners and employees compatible
 42. See Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return
 to Corporate Specialization, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON EcONoMIc ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1 (Martin
 N. Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1990); Amar Bhide, The Causes and Consequences of Hostile Takeovers,
 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 1989, at 36, 52 ("real source of gains in hostile takeovers lies in splitting
 up diversified companies"); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Do Managerial Objectives
 Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. FIN. 31, 47 (1990) (evidence "that the source of bust-up gains in the 1980s
 is the reversal of the unrelated diversification of the 1960s and the 1970s").
 43. See Aoki, Toward an Economic Model, supra note 8, at 14-15; Masahiko Aoki, Ex Post Monitoring
 by the Main Bank (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) [hereinafter Aoki, Ex Post
 Monitoring]; Masahiko Aoki & Paul Sheard, The Role of the Japanese Main Bank in the Corporate
 Governance Structure in Japan (1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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 and on enforcing implicit contracts among related firms.44 In the next Part,
 we seek to extend this work by explaining the keiretsu as a form of industrial
 organization motivated by the need to support multilateral relation-specific
 investment. Then we explore the circumstances, notably competition in the
 product market, under which such an organization can flourish.
 III. THE JAPANESE SYSTEM AS GLOBAL CONTRACTUAL GOVERNANCE
 OF WHICH SPECIFIC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IS A SUBSET
 One-third of Japanese corporate cross-holdings is not held by financial
 institutions, but by industrial companies, which are often suppliers or customers
 of the portfolio company.45 What is the function of this one-third of the
 cross-holdings? Can the Japanese system be partly understood as a form of
 industrial organization, as a means to integrate customers and suppliers, different
 pieces in the production process, of which capital suppliers are only one
 component? In this Part, we develop a simple model of the Japanese system
 in which cross-ownership's primary purpose is to foster efficient production,
 not directly to provide monitoring by the residual equity holder. The inquiry
 here focuses less on corporate governance than on industrial organization.46
 Two introductory points should be made, one substantive and one method-
 ological. The substantive point is that we take as the Japanese structure not a
 single Japanese corporation in isolation, but the keiretsu structure-the
 interlocking webs of firms, which loom so large in the Japanese economy.47
 44. Professor Aoki may be the most explicit in identifying these links. Concentrating on the structure
 of a single corporation, his three Duality principles-between a firm's coordination and incentive modes,
 its decision hierarchy and incentive-ranking hierarchy, and the interests of ownership and employees-link
 the Japanese corporation's success to a particular economic environment and a particular type of production.
 AoKI, A SYSTEM OF ATTRIBUTES, supra note 8, at 10-20. See KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS, supra note
 8, at 53-82 (treating, most ambitiously, overall structure of keiretsu as designed to support exchange among
 member corporations, as system of contractual, not corporate, governance); KESTER, GOVERNANCE, supra
 note 8, at 14-31 (same); GERALD T. GARVEY & PETER L. SWAN, THE INTERACTION BETWEEN FINANCIAL
 AND EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: A FORMAL MODEL OF JAPANESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Australian
 Graduate School of Management, University of New South Wales Working Paper, 1991) (linking main bank
 and keiretsu cross-holding features of Japanese system to structure of employee incentives); PAUL SHEARD,
 THE ECONOMICS OF INTERLOCKING SHAREHOLDINGS IN JAPAN 21-22 (Center for Economic Policy Research,
 Stanford University Working Paper No. 259, 1991); Erik Berglof & Enrico Perotti, The Japanese Keiretsu
 as a Collective Enforcement Mechanism (Jan. 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (modeling
 keiretsu as technique for enforcement of implicit contracts among member firms).
 45. Futatsugi, supra note 9, at 17, 18.
 46. Traditional theory of the firm was not a theory of the firm at all, but rather described how firms
 behaved under different competitive conditions. See, e.g., R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA
 386 (1937); R.H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1992) (Nobel
 lecture). The firm itself remained a black box. An agency-based theory of the firm opened the box to find
 a nexus of contracts. More recent comparative corporate governance scholarship seeks to move the analysis
 down yet another level and examine how firm structure-the particular pattern of contracts whose nexus
 is the firm-relates to the actual productive activities of the firm. Like the early physicists, we are finding
 boxes within boxes.
 47. While only one-tenth of 1% of Japanese corporations belong to a keiretsu, member firms account
 for approximately one-quarter of total corporate sales and represent one-half of all listed Japanese corporations.
 KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS, supra note 8, at 55.
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 The study of American corporate governance concentrates on the structure of
 a single firm, say, General Motors; a Japanese keiretsu may include the
 equivalent of GM, GE, US Steel (now USX), and IBM, as separate firms. A
 keiretsu might have a car assembler, a steel company (which supplies steel sheets
 for cars and buys furnaces for its factories from the electrical machinery
 company), and a computer firm (which supplies microprocessors for the cars,
 appliances, machines, and factory).48 Each company would have some separate
 existence, but through extensive cross-ownership,49 these quasi-firms would
 blend at the edges. We take the entire structure-all these quasi-firms, in Japan,
 the keiretsu-as the meta-firm, the object of our study.50 In the United States,
 we would typically view these as separate firms that interconnect only via
 contract. Americans would define the "firm" as including only the wholly-owned
 subsidiaries of the core firm; GM's Fisher body plant and EDS's computer
 operation-once separate companies-would now be seen as part of a single,
 GM firm.
 Although about 50% of the stock in large Japanese firms is held by banks
 and insurers, often in large blocks, other corporations own about 25% of the
 large-firm stock. Often these other firms have supplier-customer relations.
 Banks and insurers are not the only large block stockholders: steelmakers, for
 example, own blocks of the leading automakers, their customers.52 This is our
 point of departure: although we do not need to displace the bank monitoring
 theories, focusing on bank monitoring alone could blind us to a potentially
 critical feature of the Japanese ownership structure. We hypothesize that fostering
 relational contracting is the function of the one-third of corporate cross-ownership
 not held by the banks.
 48. Japanese keiretsu are of two general types, vertical and horizontal (or intermarket). Vertical keiretsu
 comprise suppliers, distributors and capital providers of an industry-specific manufacturing concern. In contrast,
 horizontal keiretsu include a number of manufacturers across different industries, a trading company, a large
 bank, and insurance companies. Some vertical keiretsu overlap with horizontal keiretsu. See Michael Gerlach,
 Alliance Capitalism: The Social Organization of Japanese Business 12-13 (1992) (unpublished manuscript,
 on file with authors); Ulrike Schaede, Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Investors, Management
 Monitoring and Corporate Stakeholders (Aug. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (developing
 typology for distinguishing between the two forms of groups).
 49. To be sure, two-thirds of the cross-ownership would be held by financial institutions, but because
 the financial institutions are partly owned (although at a lower level) by industrial companies, we could
 exaggerate and make the financial institution transparent as a gateway for industrial cross-ownership.
 50. In so doing we pass over a core problem in the theory of the firm: defining the object of inquiry.
 One might conceive of a theory of the firm as encompassing three questions: 1) what is the firm, that is,
 how do we define the boundary between market and hierarchy?; 2) what is the efficient boundary of the
 firm, that is, given that we know a firm when we see one, what activities should be undertaken within it'?;
 and 3) how are decisions made and monitored within the firm?, that is, the traditional corporate governance
 problem. It is interesting to note that although the second and third questions plainly depend on the answer
 to the first, the vertical integration and corporate governance literatures-responses to the second and third
 questions-are far more developed than efforts to understand the first. For example, is Silicon Valley a firm'?
 In this Article, we assume the answer to the first question: the firm relevant to our inquiry is the keiretsu.
 51. Futatsugi, supra note 9, at 17.
 52. Id. at 18.
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 We offer only a model, not a rich, institutional description of the various
 keiretsu structures. As with any model, ours carries with it familiar limitations:
 to highlight the importance and operation of a complex system, we must
 necessarily make simplifying assumptions.
 A. A Stylized Model of the Japanese System
 1. The Continuum: Contract Versus Organization
 Imagine factors of production for a product-say, five parties consisting
 of a distributor, two parts suppliers, a bank, and an assembler-which sit down
 to negotiate a cooperative structure for producing the good.53 Efficient
 production requires all the parties to make substantial investments in relation-
 specific capital. Labor at the assembly firm must learn flexible production
 methods and skills peculiar to this enterprise and its team of coworkers.54 The
 suppliers have to locate their production close to the assembler. They must
 develop, with the assembler, design and quality standards and procedures and
 a just-in-time delivery system, all specific to the parties and the product. The
 assembler, in turn, must invest jointly with the parts suppliers in the development
 of standards and procedures and, in turn, must specialize its assembly facilities
 for the suppliers' parts. Finally, the supplier of capital assures that short-term
 swings in the business cycle do not leave the venture short of funds, insuring
 against the business cycle for those who cannot diversify their relation-specific
 investments.55 But the benefits of relation-specific investment come with a cost:
 once a factor so invests, the other factors could appropriate the gains from
 cooperation. The industrial organization challenge, then, is to design a structure
 that provides the parties incentives to make the optimal investment in relation-
 specific assets. Efficiency requires loose, long-term, relational investments, which
 create the risk of opportunism. Maximizing productive efficiency and minimizing
 opportunism are the goals of contractual governance.
 But what type of arrangement will maximize efficiency and minimize
 opportunism? The continuum of possible structures is anchored by two extremes,
 one pure contract, the other pure organization. On the idealized contractual end
 of the continuum, one factor becomes the entrepreneur and uses highly specific
 contracts to organize production; these contracts specify the terms on which
 the entrepreneur can acquire goods and services from the other factors under
 53. Our stylized model most closely resembles a vertical keiretsu. There are, however, substantial intra-
 keiretsu purchases and sales even within an intermarket, horizontal keiretsu. See infra note 70.
 54. See AoKI, A SYSTEM OF ATTRIBUTEs, supra note 8, at 8; HIDESHI ITOH, JAPANESE HUMAN RESOURCE
 MANAGEMENT FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF INCENTIVE THEORY (Center for Economic Policy Research, Stanford
 University Working Paper No. 258, 1991) (reviewing economic structure of Japanese employment patterns);
 SHEARD, supra note 44, at 24-26.
 55. See, e.g., SHEARD, supra note 44, at 21-24.
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 all possible future circumstances, thereby preventing all involved from acting
 opportunistically. Every contingency is anticipated and dealt with in this perfect
 contract, whose terms will be judicially enforced without significant friction.
 This "firm" is a loose connection of factors that are linked through a nexus of
 arm's-length contracts. On the idealized organizational end of the continuum,
 few arm's-length contracts are specified: the entrepreneurial factor buys up, or
 establishes by itself, the other factors. This firm vertically integrates.
 These two idealized extremes capture much of the tension that has motivated
 American academic debate over contractual governance. Limited foresight and
 the threat opportunism presents to relation-specific investment render neoclassical
 contracting incapable of providing a complete structure for organizing production.
 Perfect contractual governance is impossible. But the other extreme, vertical
 integration, presents its own problems. Organizing production solely within a
 firm increases the capital and managerial expertise required and creates the Berle-
 Means problem. The substitution of ownership for market procurement-making
 rather than buying-requires effective internal incentives and monitoring to avoid
 organizational opportunism.
 2. Japan. A Hybrid Between Contract and Organization
 Our model puts the Japanese keiretsu in the middle of the continuum, a
 region that has received inadequate attention in the American corporate
 governance debate.58 Partial vertical integration through partial cross-ownership,
 combined with market contracting, incorporates features of both contract and
 organization.
 Suppose our factors of production seek to avoid both the bounded rationality
 that limits neoclassical contracting and the agency costs that limit corporate
 governance. They deliberately use an open-ended relational contract-one
 committing the parties to a long-term affiliation for the production of the good,
 but consigning to the parties' good intentions the way in which the terms of
 trade for relation-specific assets will respond to unexpected changes in
 conditions. Kester, for example, describes the basic agreement between supplier
 56. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC LNSTIuTTIONS OF CAPITALISM 69 (1985).
 57. See Oliver D. Hart, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119,
 120 (1988); Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable
 Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
 58. The lack of attention to intermediate forms of organization in the United States may reflect the
 character of production during the debate. As Piore and Sabel show, the pattern of U.S. manufacturing prior
 to 1980 stressed specialized machinery and unspecialized labor as a means of creating and exhausting scale
 economies in a period of relative economic calm. PIORE & SABEL, supra note 30, at 27. Intermediate solutions
 work well where greater numbers of products produced, and lower product life-spans, increase returns from
 flexible human-capital investment yet decrease economies of scale resulting from specialized machinery.
 See Aoki, Toward an Economic Model, supra note 8, at 7-10.
 59. On this point, our strongest precursor is Kester. KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS, supra note 8, at
 80-81. Some of what seem to American eyes to be corporate governance matters are really corporate
 arrangements that facilitate relational contracting.
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 and assembler in the Japanese auto industry: "The buyer and seller will operate
 on a basis of mutual respect for each other's autonomy and undertake to establish
 and maintain an atmosphere of mutual trust in business dealings."60
 While this intermediate solution has the surface appeal of steering a course
 between the Scylla of neoclassical contracting and the Charybdis of vertical
 integration, without more, the covenant of future good faith is illusory. What
 assures the factor providers that one of them will not take advantage of the others
 tomorrow when exploitation is possible? In the absence of an effective barrier
 to opportunism, the corrosive effect of anticipated misbehavior will cause mid-
 range solutions to devolve into either vertical integration or short-term
 61
 contracting.
 Cross-ownership of equity among factor providers-a central feature of the
 Japanese system-helps reduce this opportunism.62 Suppose that in our
 hypothetical organizational design problem, each of the five factor providers
 supports its investment in relation-specific assets by exchanging equity interests
 so that each owns twenty percent of the other four.63 In this setting, the cross-
 holdings help enforce the commitment to a good faith determination of new
 terms of trade for relation-specific assets following the occurrence of an
 unexpected state of the world. Cross-ownership prevents the party having the
 chance to act opportunistically from doing SO.64 With stock ownership, the other
 60. KESTER, GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 19. This mode of contracting is not limited to the automobile
 industry. Kester refers more generally to claims "that a typical Japanese contract does not even state definitely
 the transactions at stake so as not to restrict the flexibility considered necessary for good performance." Id.
 at 19 n.7. Similarly, Akio Morita, chairman of Sony, explains that all Japanese contracts contain a provision
 to the effect that "in the event of disagreement, both parties to the contract agree[] to sit down together in
 good faith and work out their differences." Akio Morita, Do Companies Need Lawyers? Sony's Experiences
 in the United States, 30 JAPAN Q. 2, 3 (1983).
 61. Note how closely the description of Japanese contracting parallels Oliver Williamson's description
 of the simple form of contract that would suffice in a world in which opportunism was somehow impossible:
 "A general clause, to which both parties would agree, to the effect that 'I will behave responsibly rather
 than seek individual advantage when an occasion to adapt arises'...." Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost
 Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 233, 241 (1979). See generally
 Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 5 (1985). For an effort
 to understand barriers to opportunism in dealings between Japanese firms, see Ronald J. Gilson, Value
 Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 308-10 (1984).
 62. This protection is a hybrid of spontaneous and intentional governance techniques, that is, invisible
 hand techniques as well as a conscious contractual protective governance structure. See Oliver Williamson,
 Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and Intentional Governance, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 159 (1991) (Special
 Issue). The literature also contains models of spontaneous techniques falling on both the neoclassical
 contracting and organizational ends of the continuum. See Drew Fudenberg, Bengt Holmstrom & Paul
 Milgrom, Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships, 51 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (1990)
 (succession of short-term contracts is equivalent of first-best long-term contract); David Kreps, Corporate
 Culture and Economic Theorv, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLiTICAL ECONOMY 90-143 (James E. Alt
 & Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 1990) (corporate reputation model). We do not consider these models here.
 63. We recognize that (1) Japanese cross-ownership rarely rises above 5%; (2) the keiretsu groupings
 have more than five members; and (3) there are public stockholders. We use five members and 20% to
 simplify the model, not to describe the typical cross-ownership in Japan.
 64. One also might formulate the arrangement as a means of enforcing an ex ante risk sharing agreement,
 in effect assuring that any good fortune is shared among the participants. See SHEARD, supra note 44, at
 13-14.
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 factors could coalesce to replace the opportunistic factor provider's managers,
 or threaten to sell the stock, which would leave the recalcitrant managers without
 "protection" from market havoc (or even a takeover).65 So long as partners
 making a relation-specific investment do not expect any one party systematically
 to be advantaged over time-that is, the expectation of states favoring a factor
 is random-cross-holdings of equity help to support long-term productive
 exchange, reducing the opportunism of neoclassical contracting and the agency
 costs of vertical integration.66
 The critical insight of our stylized model of the Japanese system is that
 equity serves a larger purpose than in the Berle-Means corporate governance
 model. In the Berle-Means corporation, equity has governance rights because
 the holder of the residual profits interest has the best incentive to reduce agency
 costs; the right to control rests with those who stand to gain the most from
 efficient production.67 In contrast, in our Japanese model, a big slice of equity
 serves not just to encourage monitoring through ownership of the residual profits
 interest, but also to encourage relation-specific investment by reducing
 opportunism as well.68
 Traditional main bank monitoring can be reconfigured to fit this system.
 Creditors may invest through long-term relation-specific loans just as steelmakers
 will invest in a car factory by investing in machinery and at locations most useful
 for auto steel; both the creditor and the steelmaker will take stock positions in
 the automaker. An automaker that behaves badly will induce bank intervention.
 This may appear as American-style intervention of the residual equity holder
 to some, but we believe that the relationship is more complex, because it is
 65. Dumping stock seems to be the implicit threat in Japan. See Roe, supra note 10.
 66. In this regard, our model is similar to that of Berglof & Perotti, supra note 44; see also WILLIAMSON,
 supra note 56, at 158-59; Gary P. Pisano, Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from
 the Biotechnology Industry, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 109 (1989). However, we extend the insight, albeit
 informally, to include a determination of what substantive arrangement is enforced-hard work or
 shirking-and the market circumstances necessary for the technique's success. See infra Part III(B)(1).
 67. As one of us stated 10 years ago:
 [The] description of shareholders as the "owners" of the corporation does not suggest that [their]
 role . .. flows, normatively, from their "ownership." It derives, rather, from the need for those
 holding the residual interest in corporate profits to have the means to displace management which
 performs poorly.... [T]his position is based on matters other than a preconception of the rights
 associated with "ownership"; indeed, if the statute did not provide for shareholders we would
 have to invent them.
 Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
 Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 834 n.56 (1981); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting
 in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems
 and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Henry Hansmann, Ownership of the Firm, 4 J.L. ECON.
 & ORG. 267 (1988).
 68. Note that this treatment of the Japanese system contemplates the crisis intervention role that Aoki
 and Sheard assign the main bank. See supra text accompanying note 43. In particular, our model assumes
 not only the familiar fact that main banks will own blocks of stock in their large borrowers, but also that
 the large borrowers will in turn own stock in the bank to assure that the bank does not behave opportun-
 istically. This latter assumption appears to be consistent with the facts. For example, Sumitomo Bank is
 the largest lender to 11 of its 21 largest corporate shareholders and is a major lender in most other cases.
 Importantly, these borrower-shareholders control some of the bank's stock. Roe, supra note 10.
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 deeply embedded in a system of contractual governance. The bank may deal
 with an opportunistic portfolio company. It does so, however, not just to
 maximize the returns of the residual equity holder-the American model-but
 also to protect the bank as a factor of production and provider of credit, and
 to protect the other industrial factors, in which the bank is a stockholder.
 Even bank crisis intervention or actions as an ongoing monitor are partly
 acts of contractual governance, occurring in two dimensions. First, the bank is
 protecting its loan position, just as the steel company protects its long-term
 investment in machinery tailored to a customer's needs. Second, the bank, as
 an owner of stock in the related factors, is acting as their "agent." Main bank
 monitoring is not precisely analogous to monitoring by the residual equity holder,
 even when the bank is the residual equity holder, because the bank is also a
 factor provider and owns stock in other factor providers. The factor providers
 receive their returns on investment from the terms on which they provide their
 input, not just from the residual performance of the collective enterprise.69 In
 the Berle-Means model, corporate governance serves to assure that someone
 has the right incentives to monitor. In our stylized Japanese model, corporate
 governance serves to support contractual exchange. The multiple relation-
 ships-stockholder and creditor, stockholder and supplier-increase the
 incentives to intervene (by bundling up two advantages in the relationship) and
 decrease the costs (information flows through supplier contacts and stockholder
 contacts) when a related firm has problems.70
 69. See infra text accompanying note 105.
 70. A similar theme is developed in Ito, Nezukuka Nihon-Ban M&A-M&A to Kabushiki Mochiai-no
 Honshi Tsu, Kin-yu, Dec. 1989; see Michael Gerlach, Business Alliances and the Strategy of the Japanese
 Firm, CAL. MGMT. REV., Fall 1987, at 126, 133 (cross-holdings "create a structure of stable, mutual
 relationships among trading partners"); KESTER, GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 26 (cross-holdings "'cement'
 business relationships among companies and serve as indicators of mutual long-term commitments").
 Our model assumes complete cross-holdings and virtually complete intra-group trade. The reality is
 much less extreme. With respect to cross-holdings, Kester reports the percentage of reciprocally owned shares
 in the six intermarket keiretsu as follows:
 Mitsui group 18.0%
 Mitsubishi group 25.3%
 Sumitomo group 24.5%
 Fuyo group 18.2%
 DKB group 14.6%
 Sanwa group 10.9%
 Id. at Exhibit 6 (1987 data). However, if the denominator is limited to the total shares held by the top 20
 shareholders in a company, the percentage of reciprocally owned shares increases substantially:
 Mitsui 55.2%
 Mitsubishi 74.2%
 Sumitomo 68.8%
 Fuyo 49.2%
 DKB 42.3%
 Sanwa 32.8%
 Gerlach, supra, at 133 (Table 1). Additionally, large bank borrowers appear to own stock in their main banks.
 With respect to intragroup sales and procurement, Kester reports average intragroup sales among all
 group industrial companies in 1981 as 20.4% (29% among original zaibatsu groups) and average intragroup
 procurement as 12.4% (18.6% among original zaibatsu groups), with a variance of between 8% and 30%.
 KESTER, GOVERNANCE, supra note 8, at 17, Exhibit 4. Gerlach notes that such figures may understate actual
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 3. Illustration: General Motors and Fisher Body
 An example from America's vertical integration literature will illustrate our
 model.71 In 1919, GM needed auto bodies. Fisher Bodies needed a customer
 for its auto bodies. To build the kind that GM needed, Fisher had to invest in
 specific body-building assets. Fisher was unwilling to do this without assured
 purchases from GM. Without contract protection, GM could threaten to abandon
 Fisher once Fisher built the GM-specific plants unless Fisher lowered its price,
 making the GM-specific assets worthless. Once Fisher made the specific
 investments for GM auto bodies, GM could squeeze Fisher's price down to its
 variable costs (plus the value of Fisher's assets that could be redeployed away
 from GM's bodies). To protect Fisher, GM agreed to purchase its requirements
 of the specific body type for ten years from Fisher. This agreement opened up
 GM to the risk of exploitation by Fisher: GM was making an openended
 commitment to buy its requirements of the specified auto body only from Fisher.
 What would stop Fisher from raising its price? Price might be specified in a
 contract, but over ten years costs could change, making a specified price
 impossible. So, to protect GM, Fisher agreed to a formula by which the price
 would be calculated at Fisher's variable costs plus 17.6%, with the 17.6%
 presumably representing the expected value of the specific assets to which Fisher
 was committing.
 An unexpectedly rapid run-up in demand for the specified type of auto
 bodies made it worthwhile for Fisher to exploit the contract's formula to hold
 up GM. The unexpected run-up in demand for Fisher-type bodies made it
 worthwhile (from an integrated perspective) for Fisher to build new capital-
 intensive plants and locate them next to GM, but Fisher refused to do so and
 wanted to be paid under the contract formula. With expanded demand, capital-
 intensive plants would have been cheaper than the labor-intensive means Fisher
 used, but capital-intensive production disfavored Fisher under the contract.
 Eventually GM solved its problem by buying up all of Fisher's stock.
 In our abstract model, Fisher's unexpected ability to exploit GM might have
 been mitigated by extensive cross-ownership. Fisher would have been 5% owned
 by GM, 5% owned by a steel firm, 5% owned by an automotive paint and fabric
 firm (DuPont), and 20% owned by a coalition of banks, one of which would
 have been a "main bank" for this network. In such a setting, Fisher could not
 have readily exploited the unexpected loophole because a coalition of owners
 could displace Fisher's senior management. Ex ante, GM and Fisher might not
 intragroup sales and procurement by excluding transactions within vertical groups inside the intermarket
 keiretsu. Gerlach, supra note 48, at 12-13, 185-91.
 71. We draw this example from Benjamin Klein's description. See Benjamin Klein, Vertical Integration
 as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited, 4 J.L. ECON. &
 ORG. 199, 200-02 (1988).
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 have even bothered with the detail they put into the contract, a contract that
 ex post turned out to be insufficiently detailed.
 The end result for the GM-Fisher Body problem was complete vertical
 integration, raising a serious problem for our model: why is vertical integration
 not a general solution for investments in relation-specific assets? Shouldn't the
 factors always choose vertical integration-complete, not partial ownership-as
 the full solution?
 We take this point seriously and do not have a complete answer. Our
 hypothesis-suggested by GM's subsequent history-is that something else must
 be traded off. First, complete vertical integration raises the agency problems
 of large organizational structures, requiring costly investments in internal
 monitoring. GM's bloated bureaucracy and recent poor performance may be
 the result of "excess" vertical integration. Second, the cross-holding/cross-
 exchange structure differs from complete vertical integration. There is some
 resort to contract. The trading relationship between members of even a vertical
 keiretsu is not exclusive. The Japanese corporate governance system is said to
 be
 an attempt to secure the best of two worlds. By tying themselves to
 one another in groups, yet eschewing outright ownership and control,
 Japanese corporations have been able to exploit some of the
 high-powered incentives of the market that derive from independent
 ownership of assets, while relying on selective intervention by key
 equity owners to adapt contracts to new circumstances as needed.72
 The ability of even the completely vertically integrated firm to use outside
 suppliers to test the internal division somewhat weakens the distinction. If the
 internal division does not measure up, it can be disbanded. One weakness of
 complete vertical integration, however, is that if the relational failure goes the
 other way-the division performs, but the enterprise as a whole slackens-the
 division cannot easily detach itself from the slackers and migrate to a high-
 performance company.73 With keiretsu partial cross-ownership, that kind of
 migration-and the incentives it provides others in the organization-is
 possible.74
 72. KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS, supra note 8, at 80. Roe argues that the Japanese cross-ownership
 flattens authority in the large firms compared to the hierarchical pyramid in the large American firm. Flat
 authority may sometimes perform better than a pyramid of authority. See Roe, supra note 10.
 73. There is surprising mobility from one keiretsu to another. See Roe, supra note 10.
 74. We do not for our purposes here need to identify and quantify the exact value of hybridization of
 contract and organization in Japan. It is indeed possible that the difference is one of form (although we doubt
 it), arising solely from the Japanese ban on pure holding companies after World War H. For present purposes
 we only claim that the Japanese form is a hybrid between contract and organization, which may have some
 efficiency advantages.
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 B. But What About Monitoring? Product Market Competition as the Catalyst
 that Makes the Hybrid Work
 Our stylized model of the Japanese corporate system, in which cross-holdings
 of equity serve to support exchange rather than to provide incentives for
 minimizing agency costs, is not yet complete. By reducing opportunism, cross-
 holdings may support the investment in relation-specific assets necessary to
 efficient production. Acquisition of these assets, however, will not guarantee
 efficient production. Even an optimal amount of relation-specific assets must
 be effectively employed. And here, the skeptic will remark, is where the
 contractual governance model falls short. Monitoring-a corporate governance
 system directed at reducing agency costs-could still be necessary to assure
 that those in charge of employing the relation-specific assets work hard enough
 to maximize the return on investment. Without it, the cooperative arrangement
 supported by cross-holdings may cease to support efficient production, instead
 deteriorating into a cooperative arrangement to protect a collective decision by
 the various factor providers to live the good life: I won't monitor you if you
 won't monitor me.75
 In the corporate governance model, monitoring is conducted, albeit
 imperfectly, by the residual owners. And in the absence of an alternative to a
 residual owner at the center of the corporate governance model, a contractual
 governance model also will not work. Thus, the contractual governance model
 we have proffered could lead to everyone working hard or no one working hard,
 or any point in between. Understanding the success of the Japanese model
 requires that we understand what helps prevent cooperative shirking.76
 1. Competition as Catalyst
 The most elegant monitoring mechanism is intense product market
 competition. We hypothesize that product market competition and relation-
 specific investment could interact to generate a powerful monitoring structure.
 75. Coffee makes a similar point:
 [Tihe very structure of the keiretsu seems designed to ensure weak monitoring. Because the main
 bank holds an ownership level that is below five percent by definition, it must secure the consent
 of its fellow keiretsu members before it can take disciplinary action or remove senior management.
 Yet these other members share a common interest in restricting main bank interventions in the
 internal affairs of each member to occasions in which the demonstrated delinquency of a member
 firm threatens the keiretsu as a whole.
 Coffee, supra note 29, at 1300.
 As developed in the remainder of this section, the critical issue is identifying why the structure of the
 keiretsu does not ensure weak monitoring.
 76. One of us encountered the multiple equilibria problem years ago when he left his two daughters
 home without a babysitter for the first time. The children were told that each would babysit the other, the
 parents assuming that a monitoring equilibrium would result. As the children later recounted, almost
 immediately after the parents left, one child asked the other if she could have a sweet. The other child
 answered in the affirmative and made a reciprocal request-a shirking equilibrium.
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 Each factor provider has made a substantial relation-specific investment and
 must bear a substantial nondiversifiable risk in that investment. Everyone suffers
 if the joint effort does not succeed in the product market. Thus, competition
 with producers outside the keiretsu gives each factor provider an incentive to
 perform effectively.77 Additionally, the joint character of the production creates
 an incentive for factor providers to cross-monitor each other as a check on free
 riding. Because a joint product's success in the product market depends on the
 quality of each factor, each provider's relation-specific investment is hostage
 to each of the other's performance; shirking by any factor provider endangers
 all. Each factor provider, therefore, has an intense interest in the other providers'
 performance.
 Product market competition, then, gives each factor provider an incentive
 both to perform and to monitor the others' performance. In addition, the factor
 providers occupy a unique informational position. Because each factor monitor
 is also a producer with relational contacts, it need not invest significant new
 resources in information when acting as monitor: It already knows (or almost
 knows) what the target is doing by interacting in the production process. Joint
 production-of information and goods-yields factor providers real time
 information about their co-venturers' performance. A factor provider using
 another provider's parts quickly identifies any decrease in quality. Similarly,
 a just-in-time inventory system, while economizing on storage space and capital
 costs, also measures factor performance on a daily basis; the supplier's or
 assembler's inability to perform quickly becomes apparent.78 Moreover, an
 opportunist seeking to shirk at a supplier's expense cannot capture the full benefit
 of its opportunism; because it owns a slice of the supplier's stock, it will bear
 some of the cost, thereby reducing opportunistic incentives. Finally, the
 movement of executives among factor providers, said to be commonplace within
 the keiretsu,79 also provides for monitoring.
 In our model, these aspects of the Japanese system do not exist for the
 primary purpose of monitoring by the residual owner, although that monitoring
 may help them survive.80 Rather, cross-ownership and contractual relations
 facilitate monitoring if competition in the product market provides the incentive
 to monitor. In this view, monitoring is not only an intermittent phenomenon,
 carried out by a board of directors or even a financial intermediary when the
 situation so deteriorates that those at the top of the structure learn of the crisis.
 77. It is a familiar pattern in the principal-agent literature that an agent must bear nondiversifiable risk
 to create an incentive, but that the very act of creating the incentive shifts risk to an inefficient bearer.
 78. We realize that much just-in-time production often involves delivery by smaller, closely held firms
 to larger publicly held firms. In such a relationship, the smaller supplier probably does not own stock in
 the assembler.
 79. See Gerlach, supra note 48, at 173-74.
 80. The just-in-time inventory system, for example, is said to have been a response to the 1973 energy
 shock. See Takao Komine, Structural Change of Japanese Firms, 19 JAPAN J. ECON. STUD. 79, 80 (1991).
 Similarly, cross-ownership increased to prevent takeovers. See infra text accompanying notes 93-95.
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 Instead, inter-factor monitoring is woven into the fabric of production.81 Put
 differently, product market competition and relation-specific investment transform
 the production process into a low cost monitoring process. Joint production yields
 information about performance, and thus performance monitoring.
 Thus, product market competition is central to our stylized model of the
 Japanese system as one of contractual governance.82 In the presence of
 competition, the system encourages investment in relation-specific assets which,
 in turn, provides both the incentive and the information for inter-factor
 monitoring. Centralized monitors, such as a board of directors or, as we will
 argue shortly, even a financial institution, cannot always get this information
 as quickly.83
 This critical role of product market competition to the success of the
 Japanese contractual governance model suggests a means of testing our stylized
 model's consistency with observed facts. For our model to be consistent with
 the actual Japanese system, superior Japanese industrial performance should
 depend on the presence of product market competition rather than on the
 existence of a few dominant companies: Japanese companies should succeed
 internationally in industries with substantial competition and fail in industries
 when competition is less vigorous. This appears to be the case. Michael Porter
 reports that "[v]irtually every significant industry in which Japan has achieved
 international competitive advantage is populated by several and often a dozen
 or more competitors."84 The converse is also true: "While domestic rivalry
 is intense in virtually every industry in which Japan is internationally successful,
 81. Professors Aoki and Sheard also stress the importance of monitoring as a byproduct of a primary
 commercial relationship in connection with main bank crisis monitoring. They note that a company's main
 bank also carries its principal payment settlement accounts, the primary method of payment for intercompany
 transactions in Japan. By observing levels in these accounts, the bank can monitor day-to-day cash flows
 of bank borrowers, including their dealings with suppliers and distributors. See Aoki, Ex Post Monitoring,
 supra note 43; Aoki & Sheard, supra note 43.
 82. Some have observed that in the American corporate governance system, product market competition
 may substitute for the market for corporate control in providing an incentive for efficient performance. Of
 the companies that proposed dual class recapitalizations, which, by placing absolute voting control in the
 hands of management or a dominant shareholder group, eliminated the influence of the market for corporate
 control, over half were relatively young companies in fast growing markets with negative cash flows-that
 is, companies facing strong product market competition. See Ronald J. Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common
 Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 807, 824-32 (1987); Kenneth Lehn, Jeffry Netter &
 Annette Poulsen, Consolidating Corporate Control: Dual-Class Recapitalizations Versus Leveraged Buyouts,
 27 J. FIN. ECON. 557 (1990) (empirical test of Gilson hypothesis).
 83. We do not mean that inter-factor monitoring is always faster. Inter-factor monitoring of serious
 breaches will require transmission up through the factor's organization to the board (or its equivalent). Then
 that board-or senior management-will deal with the breaching factor's senior management. This
 transmission will, we suppose, usually be as slow as the board's monitoring of internal problems. The
 difference we see is that sometimes inter-factor monitoring is faster and transmission up to the board is
 unnecessary. The assembler's mid-level foreman sees bad parts and tells the supplier's mid-level foreman
 that the rejection rate is rising, leading the supplier to investigate and change. No one contacts any board
 of directors.
 84. MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 411-12 (1990). We realize that
 competition could directly spur superior performance, without going through the organizational mechanisms
 we model here.
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 however, it is all but absent in large sectors of the economy.... Almost none
 of these . . . industries ha[s] ever achieved international success."85
 2. Vertical and Horizontal Keiretsu: Helping to Explain Some Performance
 Differences
 Taxonomists divide Japanese keiretsu into vertical and horizontal types. Our
 contractual governance story best fits the vertical keiretsu, in which companies
 tend to be related, such as suppliers to an end-producer. Companies in the
 horizontal keiretsu are more often unrelated, with looser supplier-customer
 relations. Since there is cross-selling even in the horizontal keiretsu, however,
 our story has a role to play there as well.
 Our contractual governance model could also help explain a recurrent puzzle
 among those observing the large Japanese firm: the new firms of the vertical
 keiretsu-sometimes called the independents-have slightly better measures
 of performance than the old-line horizontal keiretsu.86 Some might suggest
 that the banks' role is detrimental. This does not seem to be so, however, since
 banks' blocks of independents' stock are slightly larger than their old-line
 keiretsu blocks.87 Differing main bank ownership levels cannot explain the
 slightly different performance levels. One explanation is that vertical keiretsu
 are new firms in new, initially profitable industries and have not yet reached
 their long-run equilibrium. Another is that the vertical independents have had
 families with significant ownership stakes-the Toyoda family in Toyota, the
 Matsushita family in Matsushita, Akio Morita in Sony. Family ownership and
 financial ownership give these firms two hierarchical monitors.
 We offer a third explanation. These independents are not free-standing
 corporations, like GM or IBM. As members of vertical keiretsu, consisting
 primarily of companies in related industries, suppliers and customers,88 they
 should exhibit the productive features we examine here better than old-line
 horizontal keiretsu. With completely unrelated keiretsu firms, monitoring would
 be slower, from the top, not rapid as among related production factors. Vertical
 keiretsu should provide more rapid monitoring. Thus in our story, vertical
 keiretsu have three strong brands of monitoring: top-down by institutional
 shareholders, top-down by family shareholders (sometimes), and across
 companies via contracting. Old-line companies will be weaker in the third. The
 85. Id. at 413. Komine also stresses the importance of domestic competition to Japan's international
 success. Komine, supra note 80, at 82-84. For our purposes, it matters little whether the competition is
 domestic or international, as Japanese firms seek export markets and must compete. The point is that
 competition activates the model, pushing the firms away from mutual protection of slothfulness.
 86. See Coffee, supra note 29, at 1301.
 87. See Roe, supra note 10, at app.
 88. See Gerlach, supra note 48, at 12-13.
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 strengthened form of contractual governance in the independents may explain
 their slightly superior performance.
 3. Is Competition Enough?
 If competition triggers good performance in the keiretsu and reduces
 shirking, the next question a skeptical reader might ask is, why isn't competition
 enough? Why wouldn't competition without cross-ownership induce superior
 performance?
 To a large extent, of course, it does. Firms losing customers eventually react.
 Some slower reacting firms disappear. We have no way of measuring how much
 competition acts directly and how much it acts through the organizational
 features we analyze. The point, however, is that cross-ownership can speed up
 and deepen the organizational changes that competition induces.
 A deteriorating firm loses customers. But with many long-lived assets in
 place, no particular need to access capital markets, and senior managers who
 seek a quiet life in the three years until their retirement, a firm facing only
 competitive constraints does nothing. A group of owner-suppliers or owner-
 customers, however, is not yet slothful. Such a group wants a shirking firm to
 produce quality components for the group. A group of owner-customers has
 two incentives to prevent a slothful supplier from deteriorating: first, the group
 wants a good component, now; second, it wants to protect the value of its
 investment in the decaying firm. Moreover, the group's stock investments gives
 it another method to bring about quick change: it can withdraw its purchases
 (the pure competitive solution) and it can use its stock to bring about
 management changes. It has, in the standard terminology, the options of exit
 and voice.89
 IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPARATIVE CORPORATE
 GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS
 The measure of an analytic model is whether it helps us better understand
 the world we observe. In this Part, we consider (1) the implications our
 contractual governance conception of the Japanese corporate system has for
 understanding the main bank's role, (2) the significance of the antitakeover role
 of cross-holdings, (3) the public shareholder's role in companies with significant
 cross-holdings, and (4) the stability of the Japanese corporate structure. We then
 turn to the American corporate governance system. Does this perspective on
 Japanese governance help us evaluate current proposals seeking to reform the
 89. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY-RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
 FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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 American system by incorporating institutional features considered character-
 istically Japanese?
 A. Implications for Understanding the Japanese Corporate Governance System
 1. Understanding the Role of the Main Bank
 The Japanese main bank is often seen as a monitoring paragon: solving the
 Berle-Means quest to bridge the separation of ownership and control, and
 internalizing the market for corporate control by intervening in its client firm's
 operations when it detects deterioration in performance that threatens the firm's
 economic viability. Our model of a Japanese contractual governance system,
 in contrast, allows a more limited role for the bank, as residual owner. It need
 not be the first line monitor; factor providers conduct real time monitoring during
 the production process.90
 This account of main bank monitoring's fit with our model's production-
 based monitoring is consistent with Professors Aoki and Sheard's main-bank-
 centered view of Japanese corporate governance.91 They recently argued that
 the main bank operates primarily in financial crisis, giving management and
 employees an incentive to perform efficiently: the bank frees management from
 capital market discipline and efficient performance frees management from bank
 discipline. The mere existence of a coalition of banks with large stockholdings
 may motivate managers to avoid a crisis that will trigger bank intervention. In
 addition, the cross-holdings among factors of production may help managers
 avoid falling behind competitors and the bank action such a lag would
 precipitate.
 The main bank system has also been heralded as a substitute for takeovers.
 We do not challenge the view that institutional influence, if structured properly,
 could be a replacement for, or indeed be superior to, takeovers. And by inducing
 managerial change, main bank crisis intervention replicates some of takeovers'
 desired effects. Also, Japanese managers may work hard to avoid a crisis that
 would trigger activity from an otherwise inactive group of stockowning banks,
 similar to the serious efforts of some American managers to avoid triggering
 a takeover offer. The Japanese managers' goal of keeping banks quiet could
 induce good management even without hands-on bank monitoring.
 90. Professor Aoki notes that some 400 banks had extended credit to Chrysler at the time of its near
 bankruptcy. In the absence of delegated monitoring, no bank had the incentive to gather information necessary
 to intervene early. Moveover, an enormous coordination problem impeded capturing the lenders' attention
 before disaster was imminent. Aoki, Toward an Economic Model, supra note 8, at 15 n.7. A focused group
 of lender-stockholders constantly interacting with Chrysler's senior managers, suppliers, and customers might
 have intervened earlier and more effectively.
 91. See Aoki, Ex Post Monitoring, supra note 43; Aoki & Sheard, supra note 43.
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 That said, we believe that the main bank system has yet to be shown as
 a close, proven substitute for much of the 1980's antitakeover activity in the
 United States. The U.S. takeover market of the 1980's primarily broke up the
 conglomerates of the 1960's and early 1970's, whose principal problem was
 not financial peril but the misspending of free cash flow. In contrast, the
 Japanese main bank of the 1950's, 1960's, and 1970's had little experience in
 overseeing the effective utilization of free cash flow. Few Japanese companies
 had free cash flow: they were expanding their core business, reinvesting profits
 in that core business, and seeking financing for further expansion. In this sense,
 the main bank had an easy job; the hard job is only now beginning, as more
 large Japanese firms acquire enough cash to be free of dependence on bank
 lenders. Whether the banks' dual role-as stockholder of and lender to Japanese
 firms-will induce firms to fall less deeply into free cash flow pitfalls remains
 as a fuller test of the claim that main banks internalize the market for corporate
 control.92 Our point here is not that the main bank failed as cash flow monitor
 in Japan; our point is that Japan only now is confronting the problem.
 2. Understanding the Significance of Cross-Holdings' Antitakeover Role
 Keiretsu cross-holdings are also an antitakeover device.93 Cross-holdings
 make an external takeover impossible, and the "possibility of bank takeover"94
 is said to substitute for the corporate control market in enforcing managerial
 discipline.
 Our model treats cross-holdings as a means to prevent one factor provider's
 opportunistic behavior following relation-specific capital investment by others.
 An external takeover threat has no role in this explanation. What accounts for
 the conflict?
 Part of the original motivation for cross-holdings was to secure protection
 from takeovers. Cross-holdings increased in response to the sale, from 1967
 through 1969, of stock in "Kyodo Shoken"-a company established by the
 Japanese government to acquire stock held as inventory by financially troubled
 brokerage houses. Depressed stock prices and the Kyoda Shoken overhang
 created takeover fears. Increased cross-holdings were said to be the response.95
 The motivation for acquiring cross-holdings, however, may differ from the
 92. Indeed, cross-holdings may have perverse effects when business is, or should be, contracting. First,
 the presence of free cash flow can reflect reduced product market competition, thereby lowering a barrier
 to mutually accepted shirking. In addition, customer and supplier shareholders may be more willing to accept
 expansion during a business decline than pure shareholders. Perhaps the financial shareholders (banks and
 insurers) will intervene in a role approaching a pure Berle-Means monitor, but that is in fact the question
 to be seen.
 93. See, e.g., Sheard, supra note 34, at 425; JACK MCDONALD, ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF CROSS-
 HOLDINGS IN JAPANESE COMPANIES (Graduate School of Business, Stanford University Technical Note No.
 79, 1991).
 94. See Aoki, Toward an Economic Model, supra note 8, at 15.
 95. MCDONALD, supra note 93, at 3-4.
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 function the holdings came to perform. The contractual benefits of cross-holdings
 might not be obvious or easy to construct. A catalyst-fear of takeovers-might
 have been the impetus for cross-holdings; thereafter, the positive functions were
 seen, or survived.
 The pattern of contractual governance that our model represents did not
 spring forth, fully-formed, at a single point. For example, our model assumes
 a production process in which efficiency requires substantial relation-specific
 investment by all parties. Both Aoki96 and Piore and Sabel97 associate the
 Japanese system's success with a shift in demand, leading to a responsive shift
 in the production process that in turn requires greater relational specificity with
 respect to both industrial and human capital. Multiple products and shorter
 product cycles necessitate flexible production machinery and more flexible,
 highly trained workers; the combination leads to relation-specific investment.
 It makes little difference, however, why the cross-holdings were acquired; once
 the character of the production process began to change in the direction of greater
 investment in relation-specific assets by all parties, cross-holdings helped to
 support it.
 Observers of the American corporate governance system should not be
 surprised that environmental change can dramatically alter the governance
 function of a corporation's structural features. It is now commonplace to stress
 the important role institutional investors, especially pension funds, will play in
 future corporate governance; the extraordinary growth in institutional holdings
 could, some say, help bridge the separation of ownership and control by reaggre-
 gating shareholdings.98 It is clear, however, that a desire to improve corporate
 governance did not motivate the growth of pension funds. Rather, that growth
 reflects both a post-World War II decision in the United States to provide for
 retirement security through private pension funds instead of through an expansion
 of Social Security,99 and the substantial tax incentives for individuals to use
 pensions for savings.1?? But whatever the original motivation behind the growth
 of pension funds in the post-War United States, their present function is central
 to the current corporate governance system.
 The original motivation for cross-holdings may be beside the point. Our
 model hypothesizes what their current economic function may be.
 96. Aoki, Toward an Economic Model, supra note 8, at 7-10.
 97. PIORE & SABEL, supra note 30, at 223-26.
 98. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29; Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 7, at 813-14;
 Black, Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring, supra note 7, at 896; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
 7, at 892-94.
 99. See WILLIAM GRAEBNER, A HISTORY OF RETIREMENT 215-21 (1980).
 100. See, e.g, Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and Economic
 Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991).
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 3. Understanding Japanese Contract
 In our view, there may be a more fruitful area of historical inquiry than
 Japan's takeover history. We hypothesize that Japan's path of development led
 it to rely more on relational cross-investments than on contingent contracts. Our
 hypothesis depends on our finding either weak law enforcement or a reluctance
 to use the courts. At the turn of the 19th century, when large scale enterprise
 became technologically possible, Japan imported key elements of its legal system
 from Prussia and France.101 Perhaps the Japanese were reluctant to use the
 imported system tenaciously. If so, vertical integration, rather than contract, could
 have guided large enterprises. And indeed there were large vertical organizations,
 the zaibatsu. Moreover, Japanese culture is said to resist the use of legal
 action102 and to resist discussing unharmonious conflict-a discussion that
 writing a contingent contract requires. These cultural traits handicap the effective
 use of a detailed contract.
 If law is weak, then alternatives must be found. The zaibatsu helped, and
 after their post-war prohibition, the partial relationships of the keiretsu also help.
 An alternative to the bond indenture or hundred-page supply contract is partial
 stock ownership.
 We posit three contractual problems for modern economies to solve: debt
 governance, supply contract governance, and corporate equity governance. In
 the United States, a well-developed legal system makes it possible to achieve
 passable debt and supply contract governance through explicit contracts.
 Although the completely contingent contract is unattainable, a passable
 contract-the bond indenture, the loan agreement, the hundred-page supply
 contract-can be written and enforced without impinging cultural norms. Two
 contractual governance problems are tolerably controlled in America; only viable
 corporate equity governance contracts cannot be written.
 Contrast Japan. If neither the bond indenture nor the supply contract can
 be effective because of the nature of the Japanese legal system or culture, some
 mechanism to foster long-term relations must be constructed. In the course of
 constructing such a mechanism, Japan also reduces the corporate governance
 problem.103
 101. KAREL WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER 208 (1991).
 102. Id. at 315.
 103. This is an economy-of-scale argument. Japan has three contractual governance problems to solve
 with cross-ownership. Cross-ownership may have costs, like illiquidity, see Coffee, supra note 29, at 1318-21,
 but in Japan the gains are in three dimensions. In America, the costs loom larger, because the gains come
 primarily in one dimension.
 Without well-developed relational contracting doctrines, enforcement costs may be high in Japan. If
 the standard approach is to enforce the four corners of the document without interpretive understanding,
 contracting parties may be forced to choose between the rigidities of the four-corners contract and the
 looseness of the relational structure. American contract law may give American suppliers and customers
 an alternative. We also recognize that these legally-determined results could explain not only the origin of
 the cross-holdings, but also part of their continuing rationale.
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 4. Understanding the Role of Public Shareholders in Japan
 In our model of a contractual governance system, factor providers' shared
 control, accomplished through cross-holdings, does not diminish the returns to
 any other party. This simple depiction of the system contemplates that only factor
 providers are shareholders. In actuality, keiretsu members also have public
 shareholders, holding about one-quarter of the stock. This has caused some
 commentators to question whether factor providers' demand for higher than
 market-clearing wages-growth more than price maximization with the pay-off
 to creditor-stockholders in excessive debt-comes at the expense of individual
 stockholders.'04
 Our model suggests an explanation other than exploitation for the implicit
 difference between the value of controlling factor provider shares and the value
 of noncontrolling public shares. Shareholders will unanimously favor maximizing
 the corporation's share value when separation applies: that is, when the
 corporation's decisions affect shareholder wealth only through their impact on
 the value of its shares. In our model, however, separation does not apply for
 factor providers making relation-specific investment. In order for factor providers
 to receive a return that reflects the specificity of their investment, the firm by
 definition must maximize something other than share value. Simply put, the
 factor providers make an additional investment for which they expect an
 additional return, a return not provided by maximizing shareholder return.
 An additional step is necessary to complete the argument: noncontrolling
 shareholders may well approve of the nonmaximizing behavior. So long as the
 "extra" return to factor providers is less than the increased productivity resulting
 from the relation-specific investment, noncontrolling shareholders are better off
 than if factor providers maximized share value but did not make the investment.
 Moreover, if public shareholders hold pieces, directly or indirectly, of each
 factor, they will want to maximize aggregate productive efficiency, net of costs
 to nonstockholding factors (like employees). Thus, our model suggests that to
 demonstrate exploitation of public shareholders requires more than the
 observation that keiretsu companies do not maximize share value; it requires
 the stronger claim that share value is lower than if the relation-specific
 investments were not made at all. In other words, public shareholders are only
 104. See, e.g., RYUTARO KOMIYA, THE JAPANESE ECONOMY: TRADE, INDUSTRY, AND GOVERNMENT
 167-70, 172-73, 177, 180 (1990); see Coffee, supra note 29, at 1298. Contrary to the commentators, we
 believe that the "higher" in higher than market-clearing wages must be judged in terms of productivity. If
 "higher" wages yield greater productivity, or are a needed component in a system yielding productivity,
 then the "higher" wages may benefit stockholders. We leave pursuit of this analysis for others, who might
 begin with George A. Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment,
 105 Q.J. ECON. 255 (1990). In the text we generalize this labor productivity argument.
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 exploited when they receive no return from the increased productivity resulting
 from the factor providers' investment. This showing has yet to be attempted.105
 5. Understanding the Stability of the Contractual Governance Model
 The familiar account of the Japanese corporate governance system seems
 to assume that the implicit contract it describes-assured employment, protected
 by cross-holdings from breach by takeover, and monitored by the main bank
 to assure viability-is stable. No party will break the covenant because some
 unspecified implicit remedy-perhaps reputation-deters it. Our model suggests
 a more precise analysis.
 In Part III, we described cross-holdings as protecting against opportunism
 when, in an unexpected state of the world, fortune randomly sets up a factor
 provider with an opportunity to exploit. What happens, however, when an event
 occurs that permanently devalues a factor provider's relation-specific investment?
 In that circumstance, the factor providers in our model will unfavorably alter
 the participation of the unlucky provider. While the coalition will prevent one
 lucky factor provider from exploiting the group, it will not protect a single
 unlucky provider from the consequences of a long-term shift in fortunes.
 This analysis calls into question the claim that American antitakeover
 protection (or the Japanese main bank) is necessary to support factor providers'
 relation-specific investment. Imagine that a hostile bidder confronts a target
 whose factor providers receive a return on relation-specific investment. If
 continued relation-specific investment by a particular factor provider is no longer
 valuable-that is, if the factor provider's special contribution has been
 permanently devalued-the hostile bidder will cut it off. But so will participants
 in a contractual governance system. A contractual governance perspective thus
 suggests that an implicit contract justification for antitakeover protection requires
 more careful specification.106
 B. Evaluating Reform Proposals for the U.S. Corporate Governance System
 In recent years, the Japanese corporate governance system has captured the
 vision of those seeking to reform American corporate governance. Japan appeared
 105. Professors Coffee and Ramseyer argue that the main banks' co-insurance role cannot be valuable
 to the noncontrolling shareholders "because shareholders can diversify to protect themselves from losses
 and so would not want expensive insurance purchased from banks at the price of above-market interest rates."
 Coffee, supra note 29, at 1298; see Ramseyer, supra note 38, at 112 n.66. But shareholders ought not to
 be the beneficiary of the insurance; it is the other providers of relation-specific investment who are protected.
 Shareholders can diversify risk; these providers cannot. Insurance induces the proper level of relation-specific
 investment which, in turn, benefits noncontrolling shareholders so long as their share of the productivity
 gain from the investment exceeds the above market portion of the interest rate.
 106. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European
 Corporate Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 101, 129-31 (1992) (providing more detailed
 criticism of implicit contract arguments against takeovers).
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 to have solved the Berle-Means problem.107 Yet quick, complete institutional
 imitations are difficult.'08 We next consider one such reform effort-the LBO
 association, said to be arising in the shadow cast by the eclipse of the public
 corporation-whose proponents hold out the Japanese system as evidence of
 their effort's promise. We also briefly consider the segments of the U.S. economy
 identified by our model as potentially suitable recipients of a contractual
 governance transplant.
 Our model suggests that the Japanese system differs from the LBO
 association in its specifics; as a result, it offers less support for the reform effort
 than is claimed. It is important to stress, however, that we do not mean to reject
 the reforms themselves. Rather, we argue only that the reforms must be justified
 by their fit with our system, not by their limited resemblance to a very different
 Japanese system.
 1. The Keiretsu and the LBO Association
 Michael Jensen has advanced the LBO association as a successor to the
 public corporation.109 Jensen describes LBO associations as having three
 components: (1) a sponsoring partnership that organizes highly leveraged going-
 private transactions and advises and monitors post-transaction target management
 on a cooperative and ongoing basis; (2) target company managers who remain
 post-transaction and who receive a substantial equity stake to "incentivize" their
 performance; and (3) institutional investors who provide the limited partnership
 with the debt and equity to make the acquisition.110 These entities, Jensen
 argues,
 have a fundamental affinity with Japanese groups of firms called
 "keiretsu." LBO partnerships play a dual funding and oversight role
 that is similar in many ways to that of the main banks in the Japanese
 keiretsu. Like the main banks, which typically hold significant equity
 stakes in their corporate borrowers, the leaders of the LBO partnerships
 hold substantial amounts of equity in their companies and control access
 to the rest of the capital. Further like the Japanese banks, the LBO
 107. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-8, 66, 189-90, 193-94, 286; Porter, supra note 2.
 108. See Roe, supra note 10; Coffee, supra note 29, at 1318-19, 1324-27. Roe emphasizes that the
 bank as monitor-whether through residual equity-holding or as part of a contractual governance
 system-cannot easily be constructed in the United States. Due to historical (and some current) product and
 geographic restrictions, American banks are too weak and too small compared to Japanese banks. Deposit
 insurance is too deeply embedded in the American system; massive bank ownership cannot work well without
 solving the problems arising from deposit insurance. But since we have had many more compelling reasons
 than corporate governance to solve these deposit insurance problems and have not done so, there is little
 reason to be optimistic about unleashing banking institutions. There are possibilities, Roe argues, for other
 financial institutions. Coffee believes that the current reward systems for institutional fund managers do not
 reward superior long-run performance; he believes institutions as currently structured need so much liquidity
 that they could not undertake the long-term investments said to be commonplace in Japan.
 109. See Jensen, supra note 3, at 61.
 110. Id. at68.
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 partners are actively involved in the monitoring and strategic direction
 of these firms.'11
 Finally, like the Japanese banks, the LBO association privatizes bankruptcy."12
 In our view, the LBO and keiretsu have one similarity, but two significant
 differences. Jensen identifies the similarity: financial institutions play a large
 role in both. One difference, however, is that the Japanese bank's role is
 embedded in a deeper system of relational cross-holdings. Industrial companies
 with relation-specific investments provide much of the monitoring and one-third
 of the cross-ownership in the keiretsu. In contrast, they provide none of the
 monitoring or cross-ownership in the LBO. The contractual governance structure
 among factors of production, and its dependence on product market competition,
 is critical to the keiretsu, but absent in the LBO.113
 Secondly, they differ in that the LBO association is best suited to companies
 with substantial shares in mature markets that generate free cash flow. This is
 precisely the opposite of the product market conditions that, we argue, are critical
 to the success of a contractual governance system dependent on new relational
 investments, and precisely the opposite of the crisis conditions under which
 Professors Aoki and Sheard claim the main bank has so far played its real
 role.114 The main bank's active role appears now to be crisis intervention;115
 its primary noncrisis role is to hold a large block of stock that will become active
 if managers allow a crisis to develop. We do not want to demean the potential
 effectiveness of large but usually passive shareholders-as the main banks may
 be when their credit-monitoring dissipates-if managers fear their actions may
 activate such shareholders."16 But this type of monitoring differs quite substan-
 tially from the LBO association's hands-on real time monitoring. In our view,
 11 1. Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer
 1991, at 13, 22.
 112. Michael C. Jensen, Active Investors, LBOs and the Privatization of Bankruptcy, J. APPLIED CORP.
 FIN., Spring 1989, at 35 (statement before House Ways and Means Committee, February 1, 1989); Jensen,
 supra note 3, at 73.
 113. At least for pre-1986 transactions, the LBO association did appear to privatize bankruptcy.
 Transactions occurring after 1985 reflected changes in structure that made such privatization more tenuous.
 First, publicly held debt replaced privately placed debt, increasing the negotiating costs of consensual
 reorganizations. See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 YALE L.J. 232, 236-43 (1987).
 Second, strip finance, which mitigated intrafirm bargaining in the event of distress, also declined after 1985;
 and, finally, principal payments on senior bank debt were accelerated. See William F. Long & David J.
 Ravenscraft, Decade of Debt: Lessons from LBOs in the 1980s, in THE DEAL DECADE (Margaret Blair ed.,
 forthcoming 1993); STEVE N. KAPLAN & JEREMY C. STEIN, THE EVOLUTION OF BUYOUT PRICING AND
 FINANCIAL STRUCTURE IN THE 1980s (Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business,
 University of Chicago Working Paper No. 327, 1991).
 114. See supra text accompanying note 43.
 115. Id. The reason for the difference in monitoring roles may be found in the source of the power
 to monitor; unlike the main bank, which owns no more than 5% of a client company, the LBO association
 has absolute voting control over its operating entities.
 116. Kester reports semiannual meetings between managers and bankers where the managers report
 on recent performance but do not submit budget and future plans to the banks. KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS,
 supra note 8, at 194-97.
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 the main bank's crisis role is more analogous to that of Warren Buffett's
 Berkshire Hathaway-large stakes but major action only in crisis-than to the
 LBO association.117 Finally, the amount of stock that the main banks own
 appears to be considerably less than the amount the LBO association owns. The
 main bank typically owns 5% and can usually put together a small coalition
 of other financial institutions that will reach 20% or so. In contrast, the LBO
 association frequently owns all of the company's stock.
 The point of this analysis is not to enter the debate over Jensen's claim that
 the LBO association should replace the public corporation.118 Rather, the point
 is that an analysis comparing the LBO and the keiretsu is not directly
 illuminating, because such an analysis implicitly relies on the belief that the
 Japanese corporate governance system is a response only to the Berle-Means
 problem. The LBO association's efficiency as a governance structure depends
 on its fit with the American system of weak financial intermediaries, weak cross-
 holdings among factors of production, and strong enforcement of contracts. The
 success of the Japanese main bank, which operates in circumstances very
 different from those in the United States, only illuminates the American inquiry
 to the extent that it suggests that the American system of corporate governance
 is not inevitable.
 2. Where Might the Japanese Model Provide Guidance?
 Though not perfectly transferable, the Japanese contractual governance model
 is nevertheless relevant to American problems. Three conditions are central to
 our model of contractual governance: a productive relationship among the
 participants; the need for relation-specific investment; and the presence of
 substantial product market competition. The first condition provides the context;
 the second creates the problem; and the third causes the coalition formed by
 cross-holdings among factor providers to reject a shared commitment to the quiet
 life. America's high technology industry seems an obvious candidate for
 contractual governance initiatives. Joint venture and equity participation have
 already become familiar,119 and the difficulty of technology transfer makes
 relation-specific investment important. 120 Moreover, an established group of
 venture capital investors already play roles similar to Japanese main banks, in
 particular those of crisis monitoring and privatization of bankruptcy, by
 117. Berkshire Hathaway takes large stock positions. While Berkshire's senior managers often become
 members of the portfolio companies' boards, their visible activity has been limited to times of crisis, as at
 Salomon Brothers after the Treasury bidding scandal.
 118. For a rejoinder to Jensen, see Alfred Rappaport, The Staying Power of the Public Corporation,
 HARV. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 96.
 119. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 56, at 158-59; Pisano, supra note 66.
 120. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 56, at 293-94; David J. Teece, Economies of Scope and the Scope
 of the Enterprise, 1 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORG. 223 (1980).
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 facilitating a single voice for numerous suppliers of capital."2' Finally,
 competition among products and between technologies is vigorous.
 We realize that high technology is currently one of the American economy's
 best performers, for which contractual or corporate governance improvements
 may now be unnecessary. Heavy industries-like autos and steel-are in worse
 condition and seem to have serious governance problems. Here too our
 prescriptions might fit. If each is slow to develop new technologies and
 production methods, cross-ownership among relational suppliers might speed
 adaptation. So, if new steel technologies-say, the mini-mills-are to be located
 near new auto plants having innovative production technologies, cross-ownership
 might function in a manner similar to that which we hypothesize for Japan. Each
 will double up their interest in the other's prosperity: steel firms will want a
 better customer and a better portfolio firm. Information that the firms will gather
 about each other while adapting the production process together may make each
 a more valuable stockholder to the other. Moreover, competition, which we
 hypothesize is necessary to prevent mutual shirking, is today generally present
 in both industries (to the extent that import restrictions are not severe).
 Our point is neither that the existing organizational structure in high
 technology industries mirrors Japanese contractual governance nor that parallel
 technological changes in related industries like autos and steel make them ripe
 for cross-ownership; we have not undertaken this inquiry, and our views are
 not so deterministic. Nor do we claim that American legal, tax, and financial
 structures are ready to support cross-ownership. We do suggest, however, that
 comparative analysis of the Japanese contractual governance model may lead
 to the instrumental use of such a governance structure in the United States,
 transplanted to where the structural economic preconditions to successful
 domestication are in place.
 V. CONCLUSION
 Too many efforts to understand the Japanese system have suffered from
 Berle-Means blinders. Hidden by the focus on main banks is the fact that
 one-third of the cross-ownership is held by industrial companies. 22 We
 hypothesize that cross-ownership reduces the risk of opportunism when parties
 make large relational investments. The management of any factor that defects,
 by trying to raise price inordinately, to skimp on quality, or to miss the next
 technological step in the industry, will face a coalition of stockholders. Fear
 121. See Christopher B. Barry, Chris J. Muscarella, John W. Peavy III & Michael R. Vetsuypens, The
 Role of Venture Capital in the Creation of Public Companies: Evidence from the Going-Public Process,
 27 J. FIN. ECON. 447, 449-51 (1990); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital
 Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473, 475-87 (1990).
 122. This amount increases when one attributes the bank's industrial portfolio to the other members
 of the keiretsu.
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 of such a confrontation deters defection. Product market competition keeps the
 system from lapsing into a conspiracy of passivity.
 Industrial cross-ownership has not previously been emphasized as a key
 element of the Japanese corporate system, and we believe this connection is
 important. Indeed, we suspect that some of the main bank interventions can and
 should be seen not just as the pure intervention of the residual equity holder
 (or large creditor) to protect its investment-the American model-but as the
 intervention of factor providers. The bank monitors directly by providing credit
 and indirectly by serving as agent for the other factors. The bank assumes this
 agency role partly because of its stock ownership in the other factors.
 The existence and persistence of such a system strongly supports the view
 that the American system of corporate governance is not inevitable, but is instead
 contingent on the accidents of American financial organization and political
 history. The newfound activism of some financial intermediaries and the rise
 of the LBO association also support this general proposition. But neither the
 newly-active intermediary nor the LBO replicates the Japanese system in its
 specifics. Finally, although the Japanese system may provide general deterrence
 to keep managers faithful, this system has not yet shown itself to be an effective
 substitute for the American takeover of the 1980's. The Japanese main banks
 have yet to. face the widespread cash flow and conglomerate problems that
 pervaded the targets of these takeovers. The Japanese system tells us generally
 that there is more than one way to build a large corporation. It tells us little,
 however, about whether and how American financial intermediaries should be
 unleashed.
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